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The United States-El Salvador
Extradition Treaty: A Dated
Obstacle in the Transnational War
Against Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
ABSTRACT

This Note discusses the dramaticproliferationof the Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13) over the last two decades, primarily
focusing on the efforts of the United States and El Salvador to
bring the notorious MS-13 to justice. The United States'
deportation policy in the mid-1990s and its impact on the
presence of MS-13 in El Salvador and the United States set the
backdrop for an analysis of the current weapons available to
combat the gang's transnational threat. As the international
implications of MS-13's actions expanded in the late 1990s, the
United States and El Salvador began to charter a number of
bilateral and multilateral law enforcement initiatives to address
the issue. This Note examines how the antiquatedstructure and
underlying substantive law of the United States-El Salvador
Extradition Treaty threaten the progress made by these
initiatives, evaluates the United States' current attempt to
address this threat through the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, and suggests a means to
overcome an additional barrier to extradition created by El
Salvador'sconstitutional ban on life imprisonment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"First is God, then your mother, then your gang. You live for
God, you live for your mother, you die for your gang."' Brenda Paz, a
former member of Mara Salvatrucha (MS- 13), chillingly explained the
gang's code to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents a short
time before she was brutally stabbed to death on the banks of the
Shenandoah River in Virginia. 2 After discovering that Paz turned
government informant, three MS-13 members-close friends of Pazwere "tapped" by the gang's leadership to carry out her murder.3 Paz

1.

National Geographic Explorer: World's Most Dangerous Gang (National

Geographic Channel television broadcast Feb. 12, 2006) [hereinafter National
Geographic Explorer].
2.
Id.
Id.
3.
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was seventeen years old and pregnant with her first child at the time
of her death. 4
In 2008, the FBI reported that MS-13-labeled America's most
dangerous gang 5-was operating "in at least 42 states ... and ha[d]
about 6,000 to 10,000 members nationwide."6 Currently, there are
over 60,000 MS-13 members located in ten different nations, across
two continents.7 Over the last decade, law enforcement in the United
States and El Salvador, recognizing the transnational threat posed by
MS-13, joined forces to bring the gang to justice. This effort to control
MS-13's expansion focuses largely on bilateral and multilateral
initiatives to promote information sharing and enhance law
enforcement training in the United States and Central America.8
While these transnational initiatives continue to provide key weapons
in the war against MS-13, the outdated and restrictive extradition
treaty currently in effect between the United States and El Salvador
threatens their success.
This Note addresses the structural flaws in the 1911 United
States-El Salvador Extradition Treaty9 (1911 Treaty) currently
impeding the extradition of MS-13 members from El Salvador to the
United States and highlights the provisions in El Salvador's
Constitution that may create additional barriers to extradition. This
Note then evaluates the United States' current attempt to address
these issues through the UN Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime 0 (Organized Crime Convention) and suggests how
strategic interpretation could help the United States overcome the
additional obstacles to extradition created by the El Salvador
Constitution.
Focusing mainly on anti-gang efforts in the United States and El
Salvador, Part II provides a foundation for understanding how and
why MS-13 evolved into an international threat. Part III analyzes

4.

Id.; see generally SAMUEL LOGAN, THIS IS FOR THE MARA SALVATRUCHA:

INSIDE THE MS-13, AMERICA'S MOST VIOLENT GANG (2009) (detailing Brenda Paz's
membership in MS-13 from the time she was beaten into the gang until her murder at
the hands of fellow gang members).
5.
LOGAN, supra note 4; see also National Geographic Explorer, supra note 1
(describing MS-13 as the "most violent gang in America").
6.
The MS-13 Threat: A National Assessment, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/janO8/msl3_O114O8.html [hereinafter MS-13
Threat].
7.
See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Going Global on Gangs:
New Partnership Targets MS-13 (Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter FBI Going Global],
(describing the
available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/octO7/msl3tagIO1007.htm
geographic reach of MS-13).
8.
See infra Part II.G.
Treaty of Extradition, U.S.-El Sal., Apr. 18, 1911, 37 Stat. 1516
9.
[hereinafter 1911 Treaty].
10.
U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Sept. 29, 2003,
2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter Organized Crime Convention].
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the 1911 Treaty in the context of U.S. extradition requests for MS-13
members in El Salvador. More specifically, Part III.A addresses the
limitations inherent in the 1911 Treaty's list format as compared to
Part III.B discusses El
the modern dual criminality approach.
Salvador's prohibitions on (1) extraditing Salvadoran nationalsrepealed by constitutional amendment in 2000,11 (2) the death
penalty, and (3) life imprisonment1 2 as potential impasses in the
United States' attempt to circumvent the 1911 Treaty through the
Organized Crime Convention.
Part IV evaluates the Organized Crime Convention as a
mechanism for the United States to evade the restrictive language of
the 1911 Treaty. In particular, Part IV.A discusses why the El
Salvador Supreme Court of Justice should permit extraditions of MS13 members requested under the Organized Crime Convention. Part
IV.B suggests the use of strategic interpretation to overcome a key
constitutional barrier to MS-13 extraditions-El Salvador's ban on
life imprisonment.

II.

HISTORY AND EXPANSION OF THE MARA SALVATRUCHA (MS-13)

The Mara Salvatrucha, often characterized as "the world's most
dangerous gang," began, somewhat paradoxically, on the playground
of Seoul International Park in the Pico-Union neighborhood of Los
Throughout the 1980s, with El Salvador
Angeles, California.' 3
embroiled in a lethal civil war, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans
fled to the United States seeking refuge.14 Of the estimated 701,000
Salvadoran immigrants, a substantial number sought sanctuary in
southern California.1 5 Characterized by illegal status in the United
States, a majority of the Salvadoran newcomers remained in poverty,
constantly fearing arrest and deportation.16
On the callous streets of Los Angeles, the alienated Salvadorans
once again found themselves entrenched in a war. The established

11.

DEP'T OF STATE, THIRD REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION (2000),

available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/16164.htm.
CONSTITUcI)N DE LA REPtJBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 27 (1983 ) ("S61o
12.
podrd imponerse la pena de muerte en los casos previstos por las leyes militares
durante el estado de guerra internacional. Se prohibe la prisi6n por deudas, las penas
perpetuas, las infamantes, las proscriptivas y toda especie de tormento." (emphasis

added)).
13.
14.
War, N.Y.
15.
(2004).
16.

National GeographicExplorer,supra note 1.
James LeMoyne, Salvadorans Stream into U.S., Fleeing Poverty and Civil
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1987, at Al.
TOM HAYDEN, STREET WARS: GANGS AND THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE 202
JAMES DIEGO VIGIL, A RAINBOW OF GANGS: STREET CULTURES IN THE

MEGA-CITY 134 (2002).
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and "turf-conscious" Mexican and African American gangs preyed on
Uniting together to provide a much-needed
the newcomers.' 7
service-protection from the homegrown Los Angeles gangs-young
Salvadoran immigrants formed the notorious Mara Salvatrucha.18
Armed with machetes, guns, and guerilla combat training-courtesy
of the civil war in El Salvador-the Mara Salvatrucha rapidly became
one of the most violent gangs in Los Angeles.1 9
By the 1990s, the Pico-Union neighborhood was known as Los
Angeles's "gang hotspot."20 With rival gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha
(MS-13) 2 1 and 18th Street-a largely Mexican-American gangcontrolling Pico-Union's flourishing drug trafficking market, violence
rose to a new level. 22 Battles between the two gangs over the control
of territory claimed the lives of gang members and innocent
bystanders alike.2 3 The California prison system-where many of the
MS-13 members served sentences for drug offenses and violent
crimes-did not deter the violence; instead it operated more like a
"finishing school" for the gang's members. 24

A. The United States' Initial Response to the Growing MS-13 Threat
In 1992, as MS-13 thrived on the streets of Los Angeles, El
Salvador ended its twelve-year-long civil war. 25 Thereafter, local law
enforcement and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) intensified their efforts to apprehend and deport gang members
illegally residing in the United States. 26 The Violent Gang Task
Force, formed by the INS, targeted MS-13, among other gangs, for the

Sam Dealey, America's Most Vicious Gang, READER'S DIGEST, Jan. 2006, at
17.
100, 102-03; National GeographicExplorer, supra note 1.
See Dealey, supra note 17, at 102-03 (describing how MS-13 was formed
18.
after persecution by other gangs).
19.
Id.; see also VIGIL, supra note 16, at 142 (stating that police believed the
gang to be one of the most violent).
20.
VIGIL, supra note 16, at 142.
21.
During the 1990s, the Mara Salvatrucha joined the southern California
gang alliance and renamed itself the Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). LOGAN, supra note
4, at 91. The gang's leadership elected to add the number "13" to their name to show
respect for and an alliance with La Eme (the Mexican Mafia), a powerful and deadly
gang formed in and operated out of the California prison system. See Jessica M.
Vaughan & Jon D. Feere, Taking Back the Streets: ICE and Local Law Enforcement
Target Immigrant Gangs, BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 2008, at 5, http://www.cis.org/arti
cles/2008/back1208.pdf (describing the connection of the "MS-13" name to the Mexican
Mafia); see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE MEXICAN MAFIA 9 (1974),
http://foia.fbi.gov/mafia-mexican/mafia-mexican_ part02.pdf (describing the ongoing
threat from the Mexican Mafia).
VIGIL, supra note 16, at 143.
22.
23.
Id.
National Geographic Explorer,supranote 1.
24.
VIGIL, supra note 16, at 144.
25.
Id. at 144-45.
26.
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purpose of investigating and deporting foreign-born members living
in the United States illegally as well as "[t]hose who have legal
permanent residency but have committed [aggravated] felonies."2 7
INS Chief Special Agent Michael Flynn acknowledged, "We are
focusing on [MS-13] in particular because it is one of the most
substantial and violent gangs in Southern California." 28
To promote this effort, throughout the 1990s, Congress
continuously broadened the list of "aggravated felonies" that could
result in the expedited removal of illegal aliens under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 29 Most notably, in 1990, Congress
added "crime[s] of violence"30 and "illicit trafficking in any controlled
substance"31 to the list. With the Violent Gang Task Force and
reformed immigration laws in play, the INS deported an estimated
seventy gang members to El Salvador in 1993.32 By January 1995,
reports of gang member deportations soared to 780.33 According to
the Department of Homeland Security, Salvadoran deportations for
criminal activity grew at an alarming rate throughout the remainder
of the decade. 34
B. The Exportationof Los Angeles Gang Culture to the
Streets of El Salvador
Despite the efforts of the United States to limit the growth of
MS-13, El Salvador, still recovering from a gruesome civil war, acted
as an incubator for MS-13's already brutal tactics.3 5 The 1992 Peace
Accords, which ended the civil conflict in El Salvador, demobilized
more than 30,000 Salvadoran Armed Forces Soldiers, 6,400 National
Police, and 8,500 other combatants. 36 The demobilization left

27.
Tracy Wilkinson, Gangs Find Fresh Turf in Salvador, L.A. TIMES, June 16,
1994, at Al.
Id.
28.
29.
Casey Kovacic, Creating a Monster: MS-13 and How United States
Immigration Policy Produced "The World's Most Dangerous Criminal Gang," 12 GONZ.
J. INT'L L. 2 (2009), available at http://www.gonzagajil.org/content/view/183/26/;see also
8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2006) (outlining the process and guidelines for expedited removal of
illegal aliens who commit aggravated felonies).
30.
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048
(1990) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006)).
31.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
Wilkinson, supra note 27, at Al.
32.
VIGIL, supra note 16, at 145.
33.
34.
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security reported that criminal
charges have led to the deportation of 28,810 Salvadoran nationals since 1999. DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 97, 100, 103 (2009).
35.
National Geographic Explorer, supra note 1; see VIGIL, supra note 16, at
145 (recounting how more stringent deportation tactics promoted gang activity in Latin
America).
36.
U.S. AGENCY OF INTL DEV. [USAID], BUREAU FOR LATIN AM. & CARIB.
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF REG'L SUSTAINABLE DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG

2011]

TRANSNATIONAL

WAR AGAINST MARA SAL VATRUCHA (MS-13)

193

thousands of soldiers-ideal candidates for gang recruitmentunemployed.3 7 As an additional byproduct of the war, Salvadoran
gangs, assisted by rampant government corruption, obtained access
to a large number of firearms.38 With few employment prospects and
an abundant supply of weapons, El Salvador transformed into an
"enormously fertile ground for gangs."39
MS-13 members deported from the United States were quick to
take advantage of El Salvador's transformation by remaining active
in their respective gangs. 40 Many of the MS-13 deportees, having
grown up in the United States, were not fluent in Spanish or
connected to their local communities.4 1 As a strategy for survival,
members returning to El Salvador continued their lives as Los
Angeles-style gangsters. 4 2 Continuing the gang lifestyle was easy for
those deportees who lacked criminal records in El Salvador as they
were released from police custody upon arrival. 43 With their freedom,
44
these MS-13 members expanded the gang in El Salvador.
Impoverished Salvadoran adolescents-already desensitized to
violence by the war-were quick to romanticize the gang's way of life,
making them easy recruits for the returning gang members. 45
Adopting the Los Angeles gang structure, MS-13 members in El
Salvador formed a number of dispersed cliques, 46 covering different

ASSESSMENT 45, 50 (2006), http://www.usaid.govIlocations/latin-america-caribbean/
democracy/gangs-assessment.pdf.
37.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
38.
Wilkinson, supra note 27, at Al.
39.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
Id.
42.
National GeographicExplorer, supranote 1.
43.
Id.; see also HERBERT COVEY, STREET GANGS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 117
44.
(2003) (describing how returning gang members attracted new recruits in Latin
America).
See COVEY, supra note 44, at 117 ("The returning youth had comparatively
45.
nice clothing, money, and the romantic gang trappings that proved attractive to the
less fortunate youth of El Salvador.").
46.
MS-13 organizes itself by "cliques"-"geographically-defined subgroups"
who often identify themselves by a surname (e.g., "Sailors Locos Salvatruchos"), tattoo,
or propensity for a particular type of crime. Vaughn & Feere, supra note 21, at 6. "The
cliques work together to defend their turf, intimidate witnesses, collect membership
dues, target law enforcement, and assist each other with recruitment drives." Id.
Individual cliques hold meetings, often "under the guise of legitimate social events such
as picnics or soccer games," to discuss recruitment and gang targets. Id. at 9. Each
clique expects its members to follow MS-13's code of conduct (support fellow gang
members, do not talk to the police, etc.), punishing any member who fails to do so. Id.
This punishment can range from a beating lasting thirteen seconds to death. Id. In
2008, federal law enforcement agencies reported "signs of increasing contact and
synchronization among MS-13 chapters," which may signal an expansion of the MS-13
hierarchy beyond the clique level. Id.
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neighborhoods throughout the country. 4 7 These cliques earned their
money through drug trafficking-often acting as intermediaries for
Colombian drug cartels-extortion, and other criminal endeavors. 48
For instance, in 1994, Salvadoran police reported that they routinely
arrested gang members for trafficking drugs, stealing cars, mugging
pedestrians, and loitering.4 9 Other more gruesome reports document
MS-13 members decapitating and dismembering victims. 50
Exemplifying this brutality, one Salvadoran gang member lamented
to the Los Angeles Times that "the lack of easy access to cars here [in
El Salvador made] it more difficult to do drive-by shootings."5 '
From 1994 to 1998, the government of El Salvador recorded
33,568 homicides (an average of 6,370 homicides per year), 70 percent
of which were attributed to gangs. 52 During a visit to Los Angeles in
1999, former San Salvador Mayor Hector Silva pleaded for the United
States to help El Salvador control its gang crisis.53 Mayor Silva
exclaimed, "All over San Salvador you see the graffiti of [L.A.
gangs]." 54 For all intents and purposes, deportation from the United
States merely provided MS-13 with an effective means for
transnational expansion-an expansion that would allow the gang to
become more organized, powerful, and violent.5 5
C. El Salvador's "Firm-Hand"Approachto Gang Control
In 2003, the Salvadoran government responded to the growing
gang crisis by enacting Ley Anti Maras (Anti-Gang Laws). 56 These
laws-referred to collectively as the Mano Dura (firm hand)criminalized gang membership as an "unlawful association."5 7
Pursuant to the Mano Dura, "those that communicate[d] or
identif[ied] themselves with maras [gangs] by way of signs or tattoos"
could receive up to sixty days in prison.58 Within one year of their
enactment, the Supreme Court of El Salvador declared the Mano
Dura unconstitutional. 5 9 According to Judge Aida Luz Santos de

47.
USAID, supra note 36, at 45.
48.
Id. at 50-51.
49.
Wilkinson, supra note 27, at Al.
National Geographic Explorer, supra note 1.
50.
Id.
51.
Juan J. Fogelbach, Comment, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti
52.
Mara: El Salvador's Struggle to Reclaim Social Order, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 223, 232
(2005).
Peter Y. Hong, San Salvador's Mayor Discusses L.A.'s Importance, L.A.
53.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at Bl.
Id.
54.
National Geographic Explorer, supra note 1.
55.
Fogelboch, supra note 52, at 225.
56.
Id.; USAID, supra note 36, at 52.
57.
Fogelboch, supra note 52, at 238.
58.
Id. at 239.
59.
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Escobar of the First Court of Execution of Measures and Minor
Infractions in El Salvador:
[T]he anti-mara laws violated constitutional norms and international
treaties in several ways (1) youths were tried as adults; (2) homicide
cases not committed by gang members had advantages over those
committed by gang members; (3) the law violated the equity principle[;]
(4) the law violated the presumption of innocence until the contrary is
60
proved; and (5) the law was enforced retroactively.

Shortly thereafter, the Salvadoran government enacted the Super
Mano Dura, "an integral plan to deal aggressively with delinquents
through law enforcement, as well as to provide for prevention and
intervention initiatives."61
Pointing to official statistics, critics of the firm-hand approach
view both the Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura laws as "more face
than substance." 62 For instance, El Salvador. recorded more than
16,000 murders between 2003 and 2007-after the enactment of the
Although gang
Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura laws. 63
recruitment in El Salvador has declined since the enactment of the
Super Mano Dura, gang activities have become more violent, "moving
towards homicide and trafficking in drugs and arms."6 4 In April
2006, the Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, located
within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
reported, "Ironically, the Mano Dura approaches seem to have
actually strengthened the gangs as they band together to resist
policing efforts."6 5 These reports suggest that El Salvador's heavyhanded policies are ineffective deterrents of gang activity.
Despite this criticism, current Salvadoran President Mauricio
Funes is pushing through new legislation criminalizing gang
membership in the country. 66 This legislative push represents the
President's response to the deadly June 2010 attacks on two
passenger buses by Mara 18 gang members. 67 Critics of the antigang legislation note the striking similarities between the proposed

USAID, supra note 36, at 52-53.
60.
Id.
61.
Wim Savenije & Chris van der Borgh, Gang Violence in Central America:
62.
ComparingAnti-Gang Approaches and Policies,THE BROKER, Apr. 2009, at 20, 22.
Rail Gutidrrez, El Salvador: Hard-Line Policies vs. Rule of Law, INTER
63.
PRESS SERV. (Aug. 12, 2008), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43517.
USAID, supranote 36, at 53.
64.
Id. at 53.
65.
66.
Diego Maya, El Salvador to Crack Down on Gangs Following Bus Attacks,
INFOSURHOY (July 7, 2010), http://www.infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saiilxhtml/enGB/
02
.
features/saii/features/main/2010/07/14/featureIn June 2010, Mara 18 members killed fourteen people and left sixteen
67.
others injured after they "doused [a passenger] bus [in El Salvador] with gasoline and
set it ablaze." Id. Later that same day, the gang's members opened fire on a second bus,
killing three passengers. Id. An investigation by the PNC determined that the gang's
leadership planned the attack from prison cells in El Salvador. Id.
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law and the Mano Dura laws the Supreme Court of Justice declared
unconstitutional in 2004.68 With the Salvadoran prison system
already overcrowded and overrun with gang members, 69 it is unclear
whether this revitalized firm-hand approach is a step in the right
direction. Like the former Mano Dura laws, the new anti-gang
legislation appears to ignore "the root of the [gang] epidemic,"
hindering its potential to impact gang recruitment in the country. 70
D. The Strain on El Salvador's Prison System
The strain placed on the country's prison system by the Mano
Dura and Super Mano Dura offers one explanation for the failure of
the firm-hand approach in El Salvador. Both the Mano Dura and
Super Mano Dura allow for the random apprehension and booking of
gang members.7 1 Prior to the enactment of these laws, Salvadoran
prisons were already "the most overcrowded in the region," making it
difficult for the country to implement successful rehabilitation and
surveillance programs. 72 Between 2003 and 2004, while the Mano
Dura was in effect, over 4,000 gang members were sent to prisonbringing El Salvador's total prison population to 12,117.73
Fearing the volatile prison environment, Salvadoran inmates
often turn to MS-13 and other gangs for protection during their
incarceration.7 4 In 2005, the El Salvador Policia Nacional Civil
(PNC) reported that MS-13 recruited 1,630 prisoners serving
sentences in El Salvador's prison system.7 5 Exemplifying this hostile
prison atmosphere, on August 18, 2004, in La Esperanza-El
Salvador's largest prison-the pressure amid the 3,200 inmates in the
overloaded detention center hit critical mass. 76 Four hundred
"members of [the] notorious street gang, Mara 18," armed with
homemade grenades and knives 7"-"fashioned from broken wooden
chapel benches and steel bed frames"-went to war with the other
inmates.78 Before prison guards could contain the outbreak, thirtyone inmates were killed, "some scalped and mutilated beyond
68.

Id.

69.
70.
legislation
71.
72.
73.

See infra Part II.D.
See Maya, supra note 66 (describing the view held by critics of the
that it will be ineffective).
USAID, supranote 36, at 52.
Id.
Id.

74.

See El Salvador: The Gang Called the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),

IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN. (Apr. 7, 2006), http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/
RIR_RDIRIRRDI.aspx?l=e&id=450161 (noting that some gangs recruit in prisons).
75.
Id.

76.

Mary Jordan, Central America's Gang Crisis:PrisonRiots Reflect Widening

Violence in PoorNations, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2004, at Al.
77.
Also known in prisons as "shivs" or "shanks." Id.
Id.
78.
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recognition."7 9 This unstable prison environment provides the perfect
recruiting tool for gangs by enabling them to transform the
incarceration of their members into another means of expansion.
After the riot in La Esperanza, the Salvadoran government
separately housed incarcerated MS-13 members in two of its
prisons.8 0 By isolating the gang, the prison system-already utilized
as a tool for gang recruitment-provided MS-13 leadership with an
opportunity facilitated, somewhat
opportunity to organize 8 1-an
ironically, by the prisons' guards. 82 Incarcerated MS-13 leaders were
able to "call shots" (direct criminal activity) and communicate with
gang members in Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States by
paying the guards-who generally earn less than $300 per month-to
In 2006, MS-13 members in El
smuggle in cellular phones.8 3
Salvador alluded to the potential existence of a "national-levelleader
for MS-13 who calls the shots from prison [in El Salvador],"
demonstrating the extent of the threat posed from within the
prisons.84

E. El Salvador'sDeployment of Military Forces to Control
Gang Violence
In May 2010, with violence in the country escalating, Salvadoran
President Funes deployed 2,800 Armed Forces personnel to assist the
PNC with monitoring gangs and other organized crime.85 Assigned to
high-crime-rate sectors throughout El Salvador, the military has the
authority to "set up checkpoints, search vehicles, search people, and
arrest individuals caught red-handed." 86 Despite this boost in public
security, news reports indicated either no improvement or an increase
in gang violence during the weeks following the military's
deployment.8 7 One Armed Forces officer reported, "When we move

79.
Id.
See Robert J. Lopez, Rich Connell & Chris Kraul, MS-13: An International
80.
Franchise,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at Al (noting segregation of MS-13 members from
other prisoners to avoid bloodshed).
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
USAID, supra note 36, at 45 (emphasis added).

85.

C~sar Morales Col6n, Salvadoran Military Joins National Police to Fight

Urban Gang Violence, INFOSURHOY, (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.infosurhoy.com/cocoon/
saiilxhtml/enGB/features/saiilfeatures/main/2010/08/05/feature-01.
86.
Id.
87.
See Maya, supra note 66 (describing two attacks on passenger buses by
Mara 18 gang members, occurring after the deployment of the military, as "one of the
bloodiest days in the country's recent memory"); Ramita Naval, Salvador Children
Shoot to Kill, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, June 12, 2010, at 20 ("For the first time since the
end of the civil war 18 years ago, the Salvadoran Army has been granted powers to
stop and search people and set up roadblocks. Yet the killings have continued.").
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into a neighbourhood, most gangsters simply move out and start
working elsewhere."88
A month after the military's deployment, President Funes sent
additional Armed Forces soldiers into El Salvador's prisons.8 9 The
President's decision to deploy troops came three days after the Mara
18 attack on two passenger buses"o detailed in Part II.C above.
According to the PNC, incarcerated Mara 18 leaders organized the
attack through the use of contraband cell phones.91 Shortly after the
attack, the Latin American Herald reported, "while 1855 cell phones
were confiscated [in El Salvador's prisons] last year, many more have
found their way in."92 Arguably, if El Salvador's militant response
succeeds in preventing jailed MS-13 leadership from accessing
cellular devices, it could significantly impact MS-13's organizational
structure 93-weakening the top-tier leaders who continue to direct
criminal activity in other countries. 94 President Funes's June 2010
deployment of Armed Forces to Salvadoran prisons,9 5 if credited for
nothing more, signals the country's recognition of the growing issues
96
with gang leadership calling shots from behind prison bars.
F. The Creationand Implications of the North-South
"Revolving Door"
While MS-13 organized in the prisons of El Salvador, MS-13
cliques returned to the United States and spread across its major
cities.9 7 In 2005, the Los Angeles Times reported, "for a sizeable
number of MS-13 members, deportation is little more than a
taxpayer-financed visit with friends and family before returning
north."98 A typical cycle looks something like this: MS-13 members
return, voluntarily or by force, to El Salvador for a few months or

Naval, supra note 87, at 20.
88.
89.
Salvador President Sends Troops to Patrol Prisons, ABC NEWS, June 23,
2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=10998088
Id.
90.
91.
Maya, supranote 66.
92.
Marcela Sanchez, Central America Seeks US Help Against Crime, LATIN
AM. HERALD TRIB. (Venez.), http://laht.com/article.asp?Categoryld=13303&Article
Id=358901 (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
Contra id. ("There is a growing consensus among experts in the United
93.
Nations, Washington, and throughout Latin America that the use of military and other
'zero-tolerance' measures has largely been ineffective or worse, counterproductive for
combating crime.").
For examples of imprisoned MS-13 leadership ordering murders in other
94.
countries, see infra Part II.F.

95.

Salvador President Sends Troops to PatrolPrisons, supra note 89.

See id. ("President Mauricio Funes says jailed gang leaders often run
96.
criminal operations and order violence from within prisons ....
Lopez, Connell & Kraul, supra note 80, at Al.
97.
Id.
98.
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until they commit a crime, at which time they go back or flee to the
United States. 99 The fugitives remain in the United States until
deportation proceedings eventually return them to El Salvador.10 0
Once they are in El Salvador, research shows gang members quickly
plot a return to the United States and usually end up back in the
country within a matter of weeks.10 1 The FBI now recognizes that, in
most cases, deportations only keep gang members off the streets for a
few months. 0 2
The 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment (NGTA), produced
by the National Drug Intelligence Center, acknowledged MS-13 as
"one of the largest Hispanic street gangs in the United States." 0 3
Drug and weapons trafficking, prostitution operations, alien
smuggling, assaults, drive-by shootings, and murders are among the
list of criminal activities the NGTA attributed to MS-13.104 Although
the MS-13 threat remains higher in the western part of the United
States, the FBI reported that the recent flood of MS-13 members to
the Southeast resulted in a regional increase in violent crime.10 5
Exemplifying the FBI's observations, in June 2008, a federal grand
jury in Charlotte, North Carolina returned a fifty-five-count
indictment charging twenty-six members of MS-13 under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with
crimes ranging from drug trafficking and illegal possession of
firearms to murder and witness intimidation.106
The presence of "[v]iolent, well-armed, U.S.-style street gang[s]"
continues to increase in El Salvador as well, with the 18th Street and
Mara Salvatrucha representing the largest gangs in the country.10 7
According to the Overseas Security Advisory Council, El Salvador is
currently among the top five most violent countries in the world.' 08
On average, ten murders a day are reported to Salvadoran
authorities and, in 2007, the country's per capita murder rate was 50
per 100,000.109 Despite the country's "firm-hand" approach to gang

99.
USAID, supra note 36, at 19-20.
100.
Id. at 20.
101.
Id.
102.
Lopez, Connell & Kraul, supra note 80, at Al.
NAT'L DRUG INTEL. CTR. & NAT'L GANG INTEL. CTR., NATIONAL GANG
103.
THREAT ASSESSMENT 26 (2009).
104.
Id.
MS-13 Threat, supra note 6.
105.
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Twenty-Six Members of MS-13 Indicted on
106.
Racketeering, Narcotics, Extortion and Firearms Charges (June 24, 2008) [hereinafter
MS-13 Press Release), available at http://www.justice.govopalpr/2008/June/08-ag564.html.
107.
El Salvador 2008 Crime & Safety Report, OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY
COUNCIL (Mar. 17, 2008), https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentlD=79615.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
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control, in 2006, gang participation was only proven in 12 percent of
the murder cases that went to trial.110
MS-13's transformation into a transnational organized crime
syndicate is one of the more disturbing implications of the NorthSouth "Revolving Door." Two of the twenty-six MS-13 members
indicted in Charlotte, North Carolina "ordered murders in the United
States from their prison cells in El Salvador.""' In 2007, a similar
situation occurred when MS-13 leader Saul Antonio Turcios Angel" 2
telephoned gang members in Maryland from his prison cell in El
Salvador, ordering them to murder rival gang members in the United
States."13 Two men, suspected of membership in a rival gang, were
killed as a result of Angel's phone calls.114 That same year, a federal
district court in Maryland indicted twenty-two MS-13 members under
RICO." 5 The Washington Post reported:

During the trial of the first two defendants, government witnesses
testified that MS-13 leaders in El Salvador sent two Salvadoran gang
members to suburban Maryland. One of the Salvadorans told local
gang members that they should kill two rival gang members a week,
but local gang leaders rejected that idea because it would invite too
116
much attention from law enforcement.

With over 60,000 MS-13 members located in ten different nations
across two continents, 117 the potential for transnational organization
is disturbing.
G. InternationalCooperation in the War Against MS-13

Recognizing that an effective counter to the mounting MS-13
threat entails international cooperation, in 2007, the United States
and El Salvador announced the Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG)
initiative."18 The TAG initiative permanently stations two FBI
agents in El Salvador to work in conjunction with twenty

110.
Eric Lemus, El Salvador: Hungry for Members, Gangs Recruit Children,
INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 28, 2008.
111.
Terry Frieden, Suspected Gang Members Arrested in North Carolina, CNN,
June 24, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/06/24/msthirteen.arrests/index.html.
112.
The El Salvador Supreme Court of Justice has yet to act on the United
States' request for Saul Antonio Turcios Angel's extradition. Jorge Beltrdn,
ExtraditablesLigados a Homicidios y Drogas, DIARIO DE HoY (San Salvador), June 29,
2010, http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedhlnota/notacompleta.asp?idCat=6358&idArt=
4926156.
113.
Ruben Castaneda, MS-13 Case Adds Salvadoran Inmates, WASH. POST,
June 6, 2007, at B6.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
Id.
116.
FBI Going Global, supranote 7.
117.
Id.
118.
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investigators and ten analysts from the PNC. 19 This provides a
means for the countries "to share intelligence information on gang
activities across Central America and the U.S."1 20 As part of the
initiative, the PNC identifies, tracks, and investigates suspected gang
members in El Salvador and forwards information to the FBI. 121 In
return, the FBI provides information to different law enforcement
agencies in Central America if a United States gang case has a
connection to the Central American investigation.12 2 El Salvador and
the United States, through TAG, may also participate in joint
investigations and assist other Central American countries as
needed. 123
The TAG initiative supplemented the Central American
Fingerprint Exploitation Initiative (CAFE). CAFE, developed in 2006
by the MS-13 National Gang Task Force and the PNC, integrates
criminal fingerprints gathered in Central American countries with
the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services database, making
the prints readily accessible to foreign and domestic law
Other transnational vehicles for cooperation in
enforcement. 124
investigating and prosecuting MS-13 include the Organization of
American States Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 125 the Organized
Crime Conventionl 26-discussed in greater detail in Part IV-and the
The U.S.
Vienna Convention on Trafficking in Narcotics.12 7
Department of Justice is currently working with the Salvadoran
government to improve the process of preparing extradition requests
under these treaties.

III. BARRIERS TO EXTRADITION REQUESTS FOR MS-13
MEMBERS IN EL SALVADOR

Generally, a U.S. prosecutor seeking the extradition of a person
located in El Salvador submits a request for extradition, based upon
the commission of a crime enumerated in the 1911 Treaty, through

119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Efforts to
Combat Mexican Drug Cartels (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.justice.govl
opalpr/2009/April/09-opa-303.html.
125.
Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Apr. 14, 1996, O.A.S.T.S. No. 75.
126.
Organized Crime Convention, supra note 10.
127.
U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164.
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the U.S. Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of State.1 28
The State Department, acting as an intermediary, presents the
prosecutor's request to the El Salvador Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which, in turn, submits the request to the El Salvador Ministry of
Justice and Public Security.129 Once the Ministry of Justice and
Public Security receives the request-along with the documents
establishing the basis for the request-the El Salvador Supreme
Court of Justice reviews the documentation to ensure that it conforms
to domestic and international law.1 30 Pursuant to Article 182(3) of El
Salvador's Constitution, the Salvadoran Supreme Court may then
grant or deny the extradition request.13
Preparing extradition requests for MS-13 members under the
1911 Treaty, however, presents a host of issues unique to gang
prosecutions in the United States. By listing the crimes for which a
person may be extradited,' 3 2 the 1911 Treaty limits extradition to
those crimes that were criminalized at the time of the treaty's
ratification.' 3 3 The United States enacted RICO in 1970-fifty-nine
years after the ratification of the 1911 Treaty-to address escalating
problems with organized crime syndicates, such as the Italian
Mafia.13 4 Today, prosecutors in the United States utilize RICO as a
35
means to prosecute organized street gangs like MS-13.
Consequently, U.S. gang prosecutions relying on RICO or any other
charges not enumerated in the 1911 Treaty (i.e., conspiracy)136 face a
substantial barrier if defendants flee to El Salvador. While the
United States attempts to address this hurdle by requesting
extraditions under the Organized Crime Convention-discussed in
greater detail below-additional barriers exist, potentially blocking
successful extradition.' 3 7

Telephone Interview with John A. Beasley, Jr., Reg'l Dep't of Justice
128.
Attach6 for Cent. Am. (July 12, 2010); see generally The Extradition Process in El
Salvador, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridicolMLAlen/slv/en-slyextr
proc.salv.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
Telephone Interview with John A. Beasley, Jr., supra note 128.
129.
Id.; The ExtraditionProcess in El Salvador,supra note 128.
130.
CONSTITUCI)N DE LA REPPBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 182(3) (1983); The
131.
ExtraditionProcess in El Salvador,supra note 128.
1911 Treaty, supra note 9, art. II.
132.
E-mail from John A. Beasley, Jr., Reg'i Dep't of Justice Attach6 for Cent.
133.
Am., to author (Oct. 18, 2009, 4:39 PM CST) (on file with author).
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
134.
§§ 1961-1968 (2006); Gerald E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 667, 672 (1987).
KAREN L. KINNEAR, GANGS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 58-59 (2d ed. 2009).
135.
See generally 1911 Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11 (failing to list conspiracy
136.
and other RICO-type charges).
It is important to note that the constitutional barriers discussed in this
137.
Note are not the only obstacles to extradition. For instance, the political divisions
among the members of the Supreme Court of Justice, created in part by the election of
justices based on nominations of the National Judiciary Council and the bar, may be
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Potential obstacles to extradition also lie within El Salvador's
Constitution. For instance, attempts by El Salvador and the United
States to renegotiate the 1911 Treaty during the last decade ran into
three separate roadblocks.' 3 8 The first obstacle was the prohibition
on extraditing Salvadoran nationals-repealed in 2000-in the El
The two additional barriers blocking
Salvador Constitution.' 3 9
successful negotiations included provisions in the Constitution
banning (1) life imprisonment 40 and (2) the death penalty.' 4 '
Functionally at odds with one of the key weapons utilized under
RICO and other U.S. statutes to deter gang activity-sentencing
enhancements-El Salvador's restrictions on excessive punishment
impede the United States' ability to request the extradition of gang
members in El Salvador. 14 2 While the Organized Crime Convention
may allow the United States to circumvent the restrictive language
14
found in the 1911 Treaty, it does not remove the potential barriers 3
to extradition that arise under the El Salvador Constitution.

contributing to the current backlog of extradition requests in the Court. See Rubin
Zamora & David Holiday, The Struggle for Lasting Reform: Vetting Processes in El
Salvador, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION: VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN TRANSITIONAL

SOCIETIES 80, 101 (Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2007) (suggesting
that the politicization of the Supreme Court of Justice resulted in election-time
assurances of "friendly judgments"). While it is easy to surmise about the potential
impact of pervasive corruption in the Salvadoran government on the politicized Court,
such speculation is beyond the scope of this Note. See Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, & Labor, 2006 Report on Human Rights Practices:El Salvador, DEP'T OF STATE
(Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78891.htm (listing "inefficiency
and corruption in the judicial system" as one of the country's "most significant human
rights problems").
E-mail from John A. Beasley, Jr., supranote 133.
138.
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, First Extradition from El Salvador to the
139.
United States Brings Salvadoran National Back to Serve Prison Sentence on Texas
State Sexual Assault Charges (Jan. 29, 2010) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release],
available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/January/10-crm-105.html.
Bureau for Int'l Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Canada, Mexico,
140.
and Central America: InternationalNarcotics Control Strategy Report, DEP'T OF STATE
7
(Mar. 2006), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/voll/html/6210 .htm.
141.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPJBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

art. 27 (1983) ("S61o

podri imponerse la pena de muerte en los casos previstos por las leyes militares
durante el estado de guerra internacional.").
142.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-708, COMBATING GANGS:
BETTER COORDINATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT WOULD HELP CLARIFY
ROLES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES AND STRENGTHEN ASSESSMENT OF EFFORTS 62 (2009)

("Violations of the criminal provisions of RICO and VICAR carry significant penalties.
A gang member convicted under RICO is subject to up to 20 years imprisonment, or up
to life imprisonment if the violation is based on racketeering activity for which the
maximum penalty includes life imprisonment.").
It is important to note that not all offenses charged under RICO carry a
143.
penalty of mandatory life imprisonment. See id. Furthermore, strategic indicting or
tactical changes to an indictment can often be used to avoid a potential impasse in
RICO cases where the defendant is facing mandatory life imprisonment (assuming
such a penalty is not required by law). E-mail from John A. Beasley, Jr., Reg'1 Dep't of
Justice Attach6 for Cent. Am., to author (Oct. 18, 2010, 2:55 PM CST) (on file with
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A. StructuralFlaws in the 1911 Treaty
The 1911 Treaty, which individually lists extraditable crimes, is
a type of extradition treaty often referred to as a "list treaty."144 Most
modern extradition treaties tend to avoid listing offenses, opting
instead to apply the more flexible notion of dual criminality. 145 In
broad terms, dual criminality requires that "the conduct for which
extradition is sought . .. constitute an offense in both the requesting
and requested state."146 Thus, the modern approach supplies more
elasticity as criminals discover new and more sophisticated ways to
break the law.147 List treaties, on the other hand, are static
documents that only provide a snapshot of the criminalized activity at
the time of their enactment.
The United States' legislative response to the development and
dispersion of MS-13 highlights the issues raised by the antiquated
1911 Treaty in the context of gang prosecutions. To combat MS-13,
prosecutors in the United States rely heavily on RICO and the
Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (VICAR)148-both enacted
decades after the ratification of the 1911 Treaty.149 RICO permits
prosecutors to charge individuals "for a pattern of crimes [rather than
for the commission of a specific crime] .. . committed through an

organization, referred to in the statute as an enterprise." 5 0 The
statute provides a means for prosecutors to indict gang leaders-who,
through the use of lower level gang members, often avoid
identification and prosecution-by criminalizing (1) the acquisition of
income from, and (2) the operation of, an "enterprise."11 VICAR
generally supplements RICO charges, enhancing sentences for
defendants who commit or threaten to commit serious crimes (i.e.,
murder, kidnapping, racketeering) for the purpose of receiving

author); see also infra Part III.B.iii. For a defendant facing non-mandatory life
imprisonment under RICO, diplomatic workarounds are also available that permit the
Supreme Court of Justice to approve extradition. Id.
144.
Charles A. Caruso, Legal Challenges in Extradition and Suggested
Solutions, in

DENYING

SAFE

HAVEN

TO THE CORRUPT

AND

THE PROCEEDS

OF

CORRUPTION 57, 58 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., 2006).
145.
ORG. FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TREATY ENFORCEMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 206 (Rodrigo Yepes-Enriquez

& Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002).
146.
Id.; see also CHARLES DOYLE, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED
STATES 15-16 (2008).

147.

E-mail from John A. Beasley, Jr., supra note 133.

148.

See id.

149.
(VICAR),

18 U.S.C.
18 U.S.C.

§§ 1961-1968 (2006); Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act
§ 1959; TOM DIAZ & CHRIS SWECKER, NO BOUNDARIES:

TRANSNATIONAL LATINO GANGS AND AMERICAN LAw ENFORCEMENT 100 (2009).
150.
STEPHEN L. MALLORY, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZED CRIME 190 (2007); see

generally 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (outlining activities prohibited under RICO).
151.
18 U.S.C. § 1962.
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payment from or gaining entrance into a racketeering enterprise, or
for the purpose of maintaining or advancing their position in a
racketeering enterprise.152

The willingness of El Salvador to recognize crimes charged under
RICO, whether through the Organized Crime Convention or the
negotiation of a new extradition treaty, is an important element in
the United States' ability to prosecute MS-13 leaders organizing
criminal activity from prisons in El Salvador. Take, for example, the
Out of the
MS-13 prosecution in Charlotte, North Carolina.1 53
members
eighteen
RICO,
under
charged
members
MS-13
twenty-six
pled guilty. 154 The court found seven other members guilty at trial of
racketeering, extortion, murder, and other crimes-for which one
member received the death penalty.155 The United States, however,
has yet to prosecute the last member as he is currently jailed in El
Salvador. 15 6 The inability of federal prosecutors to obtain extradition
of the remaining Salvadoran national, despite the fact that the
Charlotte MS-13 clique took orders from MS-13 leaders in Salvadoran
prisons,' 5 7 may reflect a debilitating side effect of the inelastic 1911
Treaty. 5 8
Unfortunately, the obstacle to extradition confronted in the
Charlotte MS-13 prosecution is not an isolated occurrence. In 2007, a
federal grand jury in Maryland indicted three MS-13 members for
directing lower level members "to commit violent crimes .

.

. including

59

eight homicides in Maryland and one in Virginia."'
The defendants,
now facing RICO charges in the United States, were serving jail time
in El Salvador at the time of their indictment.160 As a result, U.S.
Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein explained, the defendants "were unlikely

152.
Id. § 1959.
See supra text accompanying notes 106, 111.
153.
Cleve R. Wootson & Gary L. Wright, Prosecutors:Defendants Were Part of
154.
Notorious MS-13 Crime Organization, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 2010,
3
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/01/1 /1177031/prosecutors-defendants-werepart.html.
Id.; Gary L. Wright, MS-13 Gang Member Sentenced to Death, CHARLOTTE
155.
OBSERVER, July 28, 2010, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/07/28/1586317/ms13-gang-member-sentenced-to.html.
Wootson & Wright, supra note 154. Note that a grand jury returned the
156.
indictment on June 23, 2008, MS-13 Press Release, supra note 106, prior to the
Supreme Court of Justice's December 2009 landmark decision to extradite a
Salvadoran national to the United States, see infra Part III.B.i.
157.
Id.
While the 1911 Treaty does not specifically list RICO offenses, thus
158.
presenting a potential impediment to extradition, see supra text accompanying notes
132-34, the United States' inability to successfully seek extradition in this case
ultimately could have been the result of a number of other issues unrelated to the
defendant's potential sentence under RICO.
Ruben Castaneda, Salvadoran Police Kill Suspect in U.S. Case, WASH.
159.
POST, Jan. 8, 2008, at B3.
Castaneda, supra note 113, at B6.
160.
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to serve time in the United States unless they were arrested [in the
United States] . . . or unless El Salvador changes its laws."1 6

B. Provisions in the El Salvador Constitution
i.

The Extradition of Salvadoran Nationals

Over a decade ago, El Salvador passed a constitutional
amendment overturning the prohibition on extraditing Salvadoran
nationals. 162 On December 22, 2009, the El Salvador Supreme Court
of Justice voted to extradite Jose Marvin Martinez, a Salvadoran
national convicted in the United States of sexual assault and
indecency with a minor.' 6 3 The decision marked the first extradition
of a Salvadoran national to the United States since the ratification of
the 1911 Treaty.164 Anticipating the potentially positive implications
of this historic landmark, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A.
Breuer stated, "Today's extradition brings a criminal to justice and
paves the way forward in our law enforcement partnership with El
Salvador. This first extradition from El Salvador to the United
States marks a turning point in our continued efforts to strengthen
65
our joint efforts to hold criminals accountable."1
Although Martinez's extradition indisputably warrants some
optimism on behalf of U.S. prosecutors, it is important to note the less
impressive practical implications of this otherwise positive shift in
Salvadoran law and policy. Article VIII of the 1911 Treaty states,
"Under the stipulations of this treaty, neither of the Contracting
Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens."16 6 As a result,
the Supreme Court of Justice retains sole discretion to extradite
67
Salvadoran gang members jailed within El Salvador's borders.1
Without any affirmative obligation to extradite nationals, the United
States' requests could fall victim to the judicial corruption and
backlog in the Supreme Court of Justice.168 According to the State
Department, the United States and El Salvador must negotiate,

Castaneda, supra note 159, at B3. Note that U.S. Attorney Rosenstein was
161.
commenting on the state of affairs prior to the Supreme Court of Justice's December
2009 landmark decision to extradite a Salvadoran national to the United States. See
infra Part III.B.i.
DOJ Press Release, supra note 139.
162.
Id.
163.
164.
Id.
Id.
165.
1911 Treaty, supra note 9, art. VIII.
166.
CONSTITUcI6N DE LA REPIJBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 182(3) (1983).
167.
See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Human Rights
168.
Report: El Salvador, DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2009/wha/136112.htm (listing "a judicial backlog, and corruption" as reasons for
the Salvadoran public's fleeting confidence in the country's court system).
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ratify, and enforce a new treaty in order for the 2000 amendment to
permanently influence the United States' ability to seek extradition of
Salvadorans.169
ii.

The Death Penalty

The sentencing enhancements-under RICO and VICARutilized by U.S. prosecutors to deter gang crime run counter to El
Salvador's constitutional ban on the death penalty. 170 Exemplifying
this conflict, in July 2010, a federal judge in North Carolina
sentenced MS-13 leader Alejandro Umana to death for murdering two
men "to maintain the gang's reputation and to advance his position
within the criminal enterprise."1 7 1 Umana is the first MS-13 member
to receive the death penalty in a U.S. federal court. 172 In regards to
Umana's sentence, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jill Rose exclaimed, "So
here's the message: If you want to bring your gang to the United
States and you want to commit crimes, you better be ready for some
American justice."17 3 U.S. prosecutors may not be able to deliver on
that promise if MS-13 members charged with crimes in the United
States flee to El Salvador prior to their arrest.
Presumably, El Salvador's constitutional ban on the death
penalty1 74 would prevent the Supreme Court of Justice from
delivering up its own citizens to the United States in death penalty
cases. Highlighting similarities between El Salvador's constitutional
prohibition and the United States' current extradition treaty with
Mexico may shed light on how the United States would approach
extradition requests for death-penalty-eligible MS-13 suspects in El
Salvador. Pursuant to the current United States-Mexico Extradition
Treaty, Mexico retains the discretion to deny a request for extradition
of any fugitive facing the death penalty in the United States.'7 5
Utilizing this discretion, Mexico consistently refuses to extradite
suspects without guarantees that the
death-penalty-eligible

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11.
See supratext accompanying notes 148-58.
Wright, supra note 155.
Id.
Id.
CONSTITUcI)N DE LA REPOBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 27 (1983).
See Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex., art. 8, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.

When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting Party and the laws of the requested Party do
not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused unless
the requesting party furnishes such assurances as the requested Party
considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed,
shall not be executed.
Id. (emphasis added).
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prosecutor will not seek the death penalty. 176 Take, for example,
Cesar Armando Laurean, the Marine who fled to Mexico in 2008 after
brutally murdering pregnant twenty-year-old Lance Corporal Maria
Lauterbach, near the Camp Lejuene military base in North
Carolina.' 7 7 Captured in Mexico, the North Carolina prosecutor's
office agreed to forgo seeking the death penalty in exchange for
Laurean's extradition back to the United States. 78
Similar to the current state of affairs between the United States
and Mexico, El Salvador's constitutional ban on the death penalty
will likely force U.S. prosecutors to remove capital punishment as an
option in these cases or "wait and see" if suspects return to the
United States in the hope that they will be apprehended by police.' 79
Professor David McCord, an opponent of the death penalty, argues
that such policies require a prosecutor to base the decision to seek
capital punishment on the arbitrary factor of "whether [the defendant
got] across the border before being arrested." 8 0 While an in-depth
discussion of the death penalty debate is beyond the scope of this
Note, it is important to recognize that the concessions the United
States would likely make to El Salvador could draw an array of
criticism from death penalty proponents and opponents alike.
iii. Life Imprisonment
El Salvador's ban on life imprisonment' 8 ' could also force U.S.
prosecutors to guarantee that the requested suspect will not face a
life sentence. In the United States federal court system, where
defendants have no possibility of parole, 82 this guarantee may

176.
See U.S. Fugitives in Mexico Spared Death Penalty, MSNBC, Jan. 17, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22717899/ ("Mexico refuses to send anyone back to the
United States unless the U.S. gives assurances it won't seek the death penalty a 30year-old policy that rankles some American prosecutors and enrages victims'
families.").
177.
Laurean's Capture Shocks Villagers, ABC NEWS, April 12, 2008,
http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?section=news/local&id=6074380;
Emily Friedman,
Former Marine Cesar Laurean Found Guilty of Pregnant Colleague Murder, ABC
NEWS, Aug. 23, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/marine-cesar-laurean-found-guiltymurder/story?id=11463711.
178.
Laurean'sCapture Shocks Villagers, supra note 177.
179.
Strengthening the Long Arm of the Law: How Are Fugitives Avoiding
Extradition and How Can We Bring Them to Justice: HearingBefore the H. Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Res. of the Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th
Cong. 2 (2003) [hereinafter Fugitive Hearing] (statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Res.).
180.
David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes: Evidence from the PopularPress
that Death Sentencing Continues to Be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary More than Three
Decades After Furman, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 797, 859 (2005).
181.

CONSTITUcI)N DE LA REPJBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 27 (1983).

See U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
182.
PAROLE SYSTEM 26-34 (2003) (describing the dismantling of the federal parole system).
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require the prosecutor to pursue a lesser charge.18 3 The impact of El
Salvador's constitutional ban on life imprisonment turns largely on
the Supreme Court of Justice's interpretation of "life." Article 27 of
the El Salvador Constitution requires the court either to sentence the
defendant to "life" or to determine the meaning of "life" based on the
defendant's age. For example, if a United States court sentences a
fifty-year-old defendant to fifty years in prison without the possibility
of parole-a de facto life sentence-has that court, under the
Constitution of El Salvador, sentenced the defendant to life
imprisonment?
According to Article 45 of El Salvador's Codigo Penal (Criminal
Code), the maximum sentence permitted by law is seventy-five
years. 184 While Articles 70 and 71 of the Criminal Code permit
concurrent sentences for multiple crimes, the ultimate sentence
imposed per count may not exceed seventy-five years.1 85 Whether a
court can impose a seventy-five-year sentence on a defendant over the
age of twenty or twenty-five-a de facto life sentence-is unclear from
the language of the Code.
Comparing El Salvador with Mexico, in September 2005, the
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion (Supreme Court of Mexico),
ruled de facto life imprisonment constitutional, despite the ban on life
imprisonment in Mexico's Constitution. 186 Two months later, this
landmark decision opened the door for the Mexican Supreme Court to
permit the extradition of suspects facing life imprisonment in other
countries.18 7
In contrast, El Salvador has yet to carve out an
exception to its constitutional prohibition on life imprisonment. 8 8
Pointing to the increase in violent crime in the country, some
politicians and attorneys in El Salvador advocate for an amendment
permitting the courts to sentence more dangerous criminals to life
without parole. 8 9 Conversely, the Procuraduria para la Defensa de

183.
But see supra note 143 (discussing tactical fixes and diplomatic
workarounds).
Codigo Penal [Penal Code], art. 45 (El Sal.).
184.
185.
Id. arts. 70-71.
186.
Francisco J. Ortega, De Facto Life Imprisonment in Mexico and the U.S.Mexico Extradition Treaty, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1017, 1017 (2007) ("On September 6, 2005,
the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Naci6n (Mexican Supreme Court), in an eight-totwo vote, ruled de facto life imprisonment constitutional, marking an unprecedented
departure from its long-standing legal tradition.").
187.
Mexico Alters Extradition Rules, BBC NEws, Nov. 30, 2005,
http://news.bbe.co.uk/2/hil4483746.stm.
See DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARcOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY: EL SALVADOR
188.
(2007), available at http://sansalvador.usembassy.gov/reports/2007/ncs/vol-i.html
("Negotiation of a new [extradition] treaty has stalled in light of a Salvadoran
constitutional ban on life imprisonment, which may prove an obstacle to extradition in
some cases.").
189.
Juristas recelosos de cadena perpetua, DIARIO DE HOY, Oct. 30, 2006,
http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2006/10/30/nacionallnacl0.asp.

210

VANDERBILT/OL/RNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:187

los Derechos Humanos (the Attorney for the Defense of Human
Rights) in El Salvador considered the 2001 increase in the maximum
penalty alone a violation of Article 27 of El Salvador's Constitution.19 0
Concerns over El Salvador's refusal to extradite defendants
facing life imprisonment mirror those echoed before the
Congressional Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources in the United States in 2003.191 The gang's
members face hefty sentences in the United States because of the
violent nature of the crimes they commit, including murder and
rape. 92 As discussed above in Part III.B.ii, when MS-13 members
charged with these violent crimes flee from the United States to a
country with provisions on extradition similar to those found in El
Salvador's Constitution, U.S. prosecutors must make tough
decisions. 9 3 They must decide whether to pursue a conviction on a
lesser offense-one that arguably does not match the seriousness of
the crime-so the requested country will extradite-or take a waitand-see approach in hopes that the suspect will return to the United
States and be apprehended by police-in which case they can invoke
a harsher sentence. 194 If a prosecutor takes the wait-and-see
approach, potentially dangerous criminals are permitted to roam free
in the country to which they fled. This reality is particularly
troublesome for countries like El Salvador, where overcrowded
prisons, corrupt governments, and street gangs make it difficult to
control dangerous criminals and prevent violent crime. 195
IV. A SOLUTION: THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME AND STRATEGIC INTERPRETATION

The current impasse to extradition of MS-13 members from El
Salvador to the United States may be surmountable without the
anticipated overhaul of El Salvador's Constitution or replacement of
the 1911 Treaty. Easily stated calls for constitutional overhaul and
treaty renegotiation are difficult to bring to fruition, as demonstrated

190.
Karin Wall, The PDDH in El Salvador: An Important Step Towards
Reconciliation and Democracy? 46 (2003) (unpublished field study, Gateborg
University, Sweden), http://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/2015/1/2003 26.pdf.
See generally Fugitive Hearing, supra note 179 (discussing the negative
191.
impact on U.S. prosecutions of the Mexican Supreme Court's 2001 decision banning
extradition of suspects facing life imprisonment).
See supra Part II.
192.
See, e.g., Fugitive Hearing, supra note 179, at 72 (testimony of Danny
193.
Porter, District Attorney of Gwinnett Cnty., Ga.).
Id. at 2 (statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
194.
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, & Human Res.).
See discussion supra Part II.B-E.
195.
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by the abandonment of previous negotiation efforts.196 Recognizing
these difficulties and the urgent need to control violent transnational
organizations like MS-13, the United States-in an effort to elude the
restrictions of the 1911 Treaty-recently began requesting gangmember extraditions under the Organized Crime Convention.19 7
While the language of the Organized Crime Convention appears to
condone this action-discussed in detail in the next sectionsuccessful extradition may still require a strategic interpretation of
El Salvador's Constitution.'9
To combat the transnational threat posed by MS-13, El Salvador
and the United States must continue to promote current
international law enforcement initiatives. Attempts to pressure El
Salvador to eliminate one of the core human rights' protections in its
Constitution-the ban on life imprisonment' 99-could risk straining
or even destroying the country's relationship with the United States.
Accordingly, the United States should tread lightly along the path to
transforming bilateral cooperation so that in attempting to move
forward, the countries do not accidentally hit reverse. A strategic
interpretation of "life," as defined in Article 27 of El Salvador's
Constitution and discussed in more detail below, could provide a
means to bridge this potential impasse without collapsing the current
routes for bilateral collaboration.
It is important to note that any strategy reducing financial
support from the United States to El Salvador could have dire
consequences for both countries. In 2008, the USAID provided over
$20 million in assistance to El Salvador to "create economic
opportunities, promote a more transparent and efficient judiciary,
support government accountability, and improve quality and access to

E-mail from John A. Beasley, Jr., supra note 133.
196.
Telephone Interview with John A. Beasley, Jr., supra note 128.
197.
Part IV only addresses the barrier to extradition created by the ban on life
198.
imprisonment in Article 27 of the El Salvador Constitution. As discussed in Part
III.B.i, El Salvador repealed its constitutional prohibition on extraditing Salvadoran
nationals in 2000. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11. However, in the decade following the
amendment, the Supreme Court of Justice only extradited one Salvadoran citizen. DOJ
Press Release, supra note 139. The Supreme Court's failure to act on additional
extradition requests for Salvadoran nationals suggests that any further attempt to
surmount this particular obstacle may require a renegotiation of the 1911 Treaty.
The prohibition on the death penalty, also found in Article 27 of El Salvador's
Constitution, appears similarly unavoidable barring a constitutional amendment. As
described in Part III.B.ii above, in formulating requests for extradition, U.S.
prosecutors will most likely have to relinquish any right to seek the death penalty.
Because of MS-13's propensity for extreme violence and rapid expansion, the goal of
this Note is to suggest the most immediate means by which the United States can
successfully seek extradition. While I ultimately agree that the El Salvador
Constitution should be amended and the 1911 Treaty renegotiated, an in-depth
discussion of the likelihood of these reforms is outside of the scope of this Note.
CONSTITUcI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE EL SALVADOR art. 27 (1983).
199.
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basic healthcare and education."2 00 In a country with a GDP of
$42.92 billion, 20 1 a withdrawal of over $20 million in funding could
cause the government to eliminate important social programs or
divert money from other areas of government spending. Either option
might potentially reduce funding for programs designed to prevent
and deter gang activity-a loss neither country can afford in the
transnational war against MS-13.
A. Evaluating the Potentialfor Success of Extradition
Requests Made Pursuant to the UN Convention
Against TransnationalOrganized Crime
Ratified by El Salvador and the United States in 2004 and 2005,
respectively, the Organized Crime Convention sets out "to promote
cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime
more effectively." 202 In particular, the Convention applies to "the
prevention, investigation, and prosecution" of serious offenses "where
the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized
criminal group." 203 Given the examples described in this Note, and
assuming the United States is only pursuing extradition in cases
where the charged offense is particularly serious-"punishable by at
least four years" in prison 204-the Supreme Court of Justice should
find MS-13 members ideal candidates for extradition under the
Organized Crime Convention.
The language in Article 3(2)(c) of the Organized Crime
Convention provides a means for state-party 205 prosecutors to attack
MS-13 and similar organizations, based solely on their status as
transnationalorganizations. For instance, Article 3(2)(c) defines a
transnational offense as one that "is committed in one State but
involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal
activities in more than one State."206 Recall the discussion from Part
II regarding MS-13 leaders jailed in El Salvador directing criminal

El Salvador Country Profile, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. 1 (July 2010)
200.
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin-america-caribbean/country/el_salvador/ElSalvad
or-country-profile.pdf.
201.
Id. at 2.
Organized Crime Convention, supra note 10, art. 1; Status of Ratification
202.

for the United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime, U.N.
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COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& mtdsg no=
XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang-en (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Status of

Ratification].
Organized Crime Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(a).
203.
204.
Id. art. 2(b).
El Salvador and the United States ratified the Organized Crime
205.
Convention on March 18, 2004 and November 3, 2005, respectively. Status of
Ratification,supra note 202.
Organized Crime Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(2)(c) (emphasis added).
206.
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activity in the United States. 207 Even if the Supreme Court of Justice
were to interpret the provision narrowly-limiting its applicability to
cliques who operate in both the United States and El SalvadorArticle 3(2)(b) would likely carve out a special exception for cases
involving MS-13 leaders directing criminal activities from the prisons
Article 3(2)(b) states, "an offense is
of another country. 208
transnational in nature if [i]t is committed in one State but a
substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control
takes place in another State."2 09
Currently, the United States is seeking MS-13 extraditions
under the 1911 Treaty and Article 16(3) of the Organized Crime
Convention. 210 In fulfilling the requirements under Article 5 of the
Organized Crime Convention-necessitating the establishment of
criminal offenses-El Salvador must enforce a regime for prosecuting
criminal organizations that is fairly comparable to the RICO
Article 16, when read in
approach in the United States. 2 1 '
conjunction with Article 5, suggests that the Organized Crime
Convention incorporates RICO-type laws into the enumerated and
otherwise inflexible 1911 Treaty. 212 Article 16(3) states, "Each of the
offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included
as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between

207.
208.
Part II.C.
209.
210.
211.

See supra Part I.C., F.
See Organized Crime Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(2)(b); see also supra
Organized Crime Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(2)(b).
Email from John A. Beasley, Jr., supra note 143.
Organized Crime Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(1).

Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those
involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity:
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a
purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other
material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act
undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or
involving an organized criminal group;
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general
criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the
crimes in question, takes an active part in:
Criminal activities of the organized criminal group;
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge
that his or her participation will contribute to the achievement of the abovedescribed criminal aim;
(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the
commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal group.
a.
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State Parties."213 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Justice should
permit the Organized Crime Convention to circumvent the confusion
surrounding extradition of MS-13 members charged with RICO
offenses under the 1911 Treaty.
B. Overcoming the ConstitutionalBarriersto
Extradition Via StrategicInterpretation
While the Organized Crime Convention may provide a means to
smooth out the structural kinks in the 1911 Treaty, overcoming the
life imprisonment stalemate requires strategic interpretation of
Article 27 of El Salvador's Constitution and Article 45 of El Salvador's
Criminal Code. 214 It appears as though the seventy-five-year
maximum sentence, established in Article 45 of the Criminal Code,
would act as a de facto life sentence for virtually all defendants. 215
The fact that the Supreme Court of Justice has yet to invalidate the
statutory maximum, however, suggests that the Court may not
consider de facto life imprisonment to be a violation of El Salvador's
Constitution. Thus, it appears the United States can request that El
Salvador extradite a suspect charged with murder, for example, based
on a promise not to pursue a sentence in excess of seventy-five
years. 216 While not officially termed a "life sentence," seventy-fiveyears imprisonment, from a pragmatic standpoint, should still
promote the goals of specific deterrence and crime prevention in both
countries.
Potential complications with this practical approach to
extradition may, however, lie in a split among Salvadoran courts as to
whether a seventy-five-year sentence is, in fact, compliant under all
circumstances with Article 27 of El Salvador's Constitution. In 2007,
the Tribunal 40 de Setencia sentenced Jose Mario Bello to thirty-five
years in prison for two counts of aggravated murder. 217 In ignoring
the prosecutor's request for the court to impose the seventy-five-year
maximum, 2 18 the Tribunal 40 de Setencia held that a sentence in
excess of fifty years would violate Article 27 of El Salvador's

Id. art. 16(3).
213.
See supra Part III.B.iii.
214.
Codigo Penal, art. 45. According to the UN Statistics Division, the average
215.
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seventy-six years. Id. Thus, the chances of a seventy-five-year sentence falling short of
a defendant's life span seem relatively low.
See supra note 143 (discussing tactical fixes).
216.
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217.
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Constitution. 219 Conversely, in 2009, the Tribunal 60 de Setencia
sentenced members of a notorious car-theft ring to upwards of one
hundred-years imprisonment. 220 Accordingly, in requesting extraditions
before the Supreme Court of Justice, the circuit split provides a basis on
which the United States can argue that the Supreme Court of Justice
should permit, at a minimum, extradition for de facto life imprisonment.
V. CONCLUsIoN

The progeny of disjointed national efforts to deter gang violence,
MS-13 represents the danger inherent in attacking a transnational
issue by shifting the burden to other nations. Deportation of Los
Angeles gangs to El Salvador in the 1990s and the subsequent
proliferation of MS-13 demonstrate the risk of punting the gang
problem to developing countries. Harsh laws, overcrowded prisons,
and rampant government corruption in El Salvador facilitated the
return of a much more organized and expansive version of MS-13 to
the United States.
Learning from these mistakes, the United States has charted a
course for international law enforcement initiatives, such as TAG and
CAFE, in an effort to form a unified global front against the Mara
Salvatrucha. Failure to reach a compromise in the extradition of MS13 members from El Salvador to the United States, however,
threatens to take back the ground gained by this transnational effort.
The United States and El Salvador must find a way to preserve the
principles reflected in their founding documents and current treaties
that will not impede their ability to maintain a unified global front
against the world's most notorious street gang. As discussed above,
U.S. requests for MS-13 extraditions under the Organized Crime
Convention, when combined with strategic constitutional
interpretation, may provide a means to address the extradition
impasse without straining the countries' existent transnational
efforts.
While the evaluation and suggestions outlined in Part IV of this
Note provide the most immediate and least drastic means of
addressing the issues encompassed in the 1911 Treaty, a complete
overhaul of the treaty and Article 27 of El Salvador's Constitution
would provide a more permanent solution to the current problems.
Nevertheless, as a decade of fruitless negotiations demonstrates, the
best solution is not always the most practicable. The one thing that
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appears certain is that MS-13 members, who live by the gang's
credo-"mata, controla, viola" (kill, control, rape)-will not sit idly by
and await reform.2 2
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